State Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON THEIR
FACE OR AS ADMINISTERED
(1789-1992)
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STATE ACTS HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Hereinafter presented are brief summaries of Supreme Court decisions
in which provisions of state constitutions, statutes, and municipal
ordinances were found to be unconstitutional either in substance or as
enforced, including provisions which conflicted with federal legislative
acts and were therefore void because of the supremacy clause. Appended
thereto are the names of the Justices who concurred in, and dissented
from, such rulings. The names of the Justices have not been set forth
when their decisions were unanimous.
I. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
1. United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cr.) 115 (1809)
A Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the execution of any process
issued to enforce a certain sentence of a federal court, on the ground
that the federal court lacked jurisdiction in the cause, could not oust
the federal court of jurisdiction. A state statute purporting to annul
the judgment of a court of the United States and to destroy rights
acquired thereunder is without legal foundation.
2. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 87 (1810)
A Georgia statute annulling conveyance of public lands
authorized by a prior enactment was violative of the obligation of
contracts clause (Art. I, Sec. 10) of the Constitution.
Justices Concurring: Marshall, C.J., Washington, Livingston, Todd.
Justice Dissenting: Johnson (in part).
3. New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 164 (1812).
A New Jersey law purporting to repeal an exemption from taxation
contained in a prior enactment conveying certain lands was violative of
the obligation of contracts clause (Art. I, Sec. 10).
4. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cr.) 43 (1815).
Although subsequently cited as a contract clause case (Piqua
Branch Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. (57 U.S.) 369, 389 (1853)), the Court in
the instant decision, without referring to the obligation of contracts
clause (Art. I, Sec. 10), voided, as contrary to the principles of
natural justice, two Virginia acts which purported to divest the
Episcopal Church of title to property ``acquired under the faith of
previous laws.''
5. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
Retroactive operation of a New York insolvency law to discharge
the obligation of a debtor on a promissory note negotiated prior to its
adoption violated the obligation of contracts clause (Art. I, Sec. 10).
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6. McMillan v. McNeil, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209 (1819).
A Louisiana insolvency law had no extraterritorial operation,
and although adopted in 1808, its invocation to relieve a debtor of an
obligation contracted by him in 1811, while a resident of South
Carolina, offended the obligation of contracts clause (Art. I, Sec. 10).
7. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Under the principle of national supremacy (Art. VI) whereunder
instrumentalities of the Federal Government are immune for state
taxation, a Maryland law imposing a tax on notes issued by a branch of
the Bank of United States was held unconstitutional.
8. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
A New Hampshire law which altered a charter granted to a private
eleemosynary corporation by the British Crown prior to the Revolution
was deemed violative of the obligation of contracts clause (Art. I,
Sec. 10).
Justices Concurring: Marshall, C.J., Washington, Johnson,
Livingston, Story.
Justice Dissenting: Duvall.
9. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank v. Smith, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 131 (1821).
A state insolvency law, insofar as it purported to discharge a
debtor from obligations contracted prior to its passage, was violative
of the obligation of contracts clause (Art. I, Sec. 10).
10. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
Inasmuch as the compact between Virginia and Kentucky negotiated
on the occasion of the separation of the latter from the former
stipulated that rights in lands within the ceded area should remain
valid and secure under the laws of Kentucky, and should be determined by
Virginia law as of the time of separation, a subsequent Kentucky law
which diminished the rights of a lawful owner by reducing the scope of
his remedies against an adverse possessor violated the obligation of
contracts clause (Art. I, Sec. 10)
Justice Concurring: Johnson (separately).
11. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 464 (1823).
The property of a charitable corporation chartered by the Crown,
being specifically protected by the treaty of peace of 1783, an act of
Vermont adopted in 1794 and purporting to convey such property to local
subdivisions was void.
12. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
By reason of conflict with the federal licensing act of 1793
authorizing vessels to navigate coastal waters, a New York statute
granting to certain persons an exclusive right to navigate New York
waters was void.
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13. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
An Ohio statute levying a tax on the Bank of the United States,
a federal instrumentality, was unenforceable (Art VI).
Justices Concurring: Marshall, C.J., Washington, Todd, Duvall,
Story, Thompson.
Justice Dissenting: Johnson.
14. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
(1) Although a state insolvency law may be applied to discharge
a debt contracted subsequently to the passage of such law, (2) the
statute could not be accorded extraterritorial enforcement to the extent
of discharging a claim sought to be collected by a citizen of another
State either in a federal court or in the courts of other States.
Justices Concurring: Johnson, Marshall, C.J., Duvall, Story.
Justices Dissenting: Washington, Thompson, Trimble.
15. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
A Maryland statute which required an importer to obtain a
license before reselling in the original package articles imported from
abroad was in conflict with the federal power to regulate foreign
commerce (Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3) and with the constitutional provision
(Art. I, Sec. 10, cl. 2) prohibiting States from levying import duties.
Justices Concurring: Marshall, C.J., Washington, Johnson, Duvall,
Story, Trimble.
Justice Dissenting: Thompson.
16. Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410 (1830).
A Missouri act, under the authority of which certificates in
denominations of 50 to $10 were issued, payable in discharge of taxes or
debts owned to the State and of salaries due public officers violated
the constitutional prohibition (Art. I, Sec. 10, cl. 10) against
emission of ``bills of credit'' by States. Justices Concurring:
Marshall, C.J., Duvall, Story, Baldwin.
Justices Dissenting: Johnson, Thompson, McLean.
17. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
A Georgia law which imposed penalties on white persons who,
without first obtaining a license therefor, established a residence
within the limits of the Cherokee Nation, was unenforceable by reason of
conflict with treaties negotiated by the United States with such Indian
tribes and by virtue of extending to an area beyond the jurisdiction of
the State.
18. Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 635 (1832).
Consistently with the principle of Ogden v. Saunders, a Maryland
insolvency law could not be invoked to effect discharge of an obligation
contracted in Louisiana subsequently to its passage.
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19. Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435
(1842).
A Pennsylvania law which diminished the compensation of a
federal officer by subjecting him to county taxes imposed an invalid
burden on a federal instrumentality (Art. VI).
20. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
A Pennsylvania statute (1826) which penalized an owner's
recovery of a runaway slave was violative of Art. IV, Sec. 2, cl. 3, and
federal legislation implementing the latter provision.
Justices Concurring: Story, Catron, McKinley, Taney, C.J.
(separately), Thompson (separately), Baldwin (separately), Wayne
(separately), Daniel (separately), McLean (separately).
21. Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843).
Illinois mortgage moratorium law which, when applied to a
mortgage negotiated prior to its passage, reduced the remedies of the
mortgage lender by conferring a new right of redemption upon a
defaulting borrower, impaired an obligation of contract contrary to Art.
I, Sec. 10, of the Constitution.
Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., Baldwin, Wayne, Catron, Daniel.
Justice Dissenting: McLean.
22. McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 608 (1844).
Illinois mortgage moratorium law, which, when applied to a
mortgage executed prior to its passage, diminished remedies of the
mortgage lender by prohibiting consummation of a foreclosure unless the
foreclosure price equaled two-thirds of the value of the mortgaged
property, impaired the lender's obligation of contract contrary to Art.
I, Sec. 10, of the Constitution.
23. Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 133 (1845).
As to stockholders of Maryland state banks afforded an exemption
under prior act of 1821, Maryland statute of 1841 taxing these
stockholders impaired the obligation of contract.
24. Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151 (1845).
Inasmuch as under federal acts ceding to Pennsylvania that part
of the Cumberland Road within its limits, and Pennsylvania laws
accepting the same, the carriage of mail over said road was to be free
from toll, later Pennsylvania law imposing tolls on coaches transporting
passengers could not extend to the mail carried therein.
Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., Story, Wayne, Catron, McKinley,
Nelson.
Justices Dissenting: McLean, Daniel.
25. Neil, Moore & Co. v. Ohio, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 720 (1845).
Ohio toll levied on passengers transported on mail coaches
traversing Cumberland Road in that State, but which exempted pas
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sengers traveling on other coaches, was void by reason of conflict with
the terms of federal and Ohio acts adopted in relation to transfer and
acceptance of said part of the road by Ohio.
Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., Story, McLean, Wayne, Catron,
McKinley, Nelson.
Justice Dissenting: Daniel. 2
26. Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301 (1848).
Mississippi law which nullified the power of a bank under a
previously issued charter to discount bills of exchange and promissory
notes and to institute actions for collection of the same was void by
reason of imparing an obligation of contract (Art. I, Sec. 10).
Justices Concurring: McLean, Wayne, Catron, Nelson, Woodbury, Grier.
Justices Dissenting: Taney, C.J., Daniel.
27. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
Collection by New York and Massachusetts of per capita taxes on
alien and domestic passengers arriving in the ports of these States was
violative of the federal power to regulate foreign and interstate
commerce (Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3).
Justices Concurring: McLean (separately), Wayne (separately), Catron
(separately), McKinley (separately), Grier (separately).
Justices Dissenting: Taney, C.J. (separately), Daniel (separately),
Woodbury (separately), Nelson.
28. Woodruff v. Trapnall, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 190 (1851).
A judgment debtor of the State of Arkansas tendered, in
satisfaction of the judgment, banknotes in circulation at the time of
the repeal by the State of that section of the said bank's charter
providing that such notes should be received in discharge of public
debts. By reason of the inhibition of the contract clause of the
Constitution, the legislative repeal could neither affect such notes nor
abrogate the pledge of the State to receive them in payment of debts.
Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., McLean, Wayne, McKinley, Woodbury.
Justices Dissenting: Catron, Daniel, Nelson, Grier.
29. Achison v. Huddleson, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 293 (1852).
Inasmuch as by the terms of a Maryland statute, assented to by
Congress, no toll was to be levied by that State on passenger coaches
carrying mails over the Cumberland Road, later Maryland law imposing
tolls on passengers in such coaches was void by reason of conflict with
an earlier compact between Maryland and the Federal Government and also
by virtue of imposing a burden on federal carriage of the mails (Art.
VI).
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30. Trustees for Vincennes University v. Indiana, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 268
(1853).
Inasmuch as the incorporation by the territorial legislature of
the University in 1806 operated to vest in the latter certain federal
lands reserved for educational purposes, subsequent enactment by Indiana
ordering the sale of such lands and use of the proceeds for other
purposes was invalid because of impairment of the contractual rights of
the University.
Justices Concurring: McLean, Wayne, Nelson, Grier, Curtis.
Justices Dissenting: Taney, C.J., Catron, Daniel.
31. Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304 (1854).
Retroactive laws which vested all property of the state bank in
Arkansas and thereby prevented it from honoring its outstanding bills
payable on demand to the holders thereof impaired the contractual rights
of the latter and were void.
Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., McLean, Wayne, Grier, Curtis,
Campbell.
Justices Dissenting: Catron, Daniel, Nelson.
32. State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854).
Inasmuch as state banks, on acceptance of a charter under the
Ohio banking law of 1845, were directed, in lieu of all taxes, to pay
six percent of annual dividends to the States, a later statute which
exposed these banks to higher taxes effected an invalid impairment of
the obligation of contract.
Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., McLean, Wayne, Nelson, Grier,
Curtis.
Justices Dissenting: Catron, Daniel, Campbell.
33. Hays v. The Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596
(1855).
California lacked jurisdiction to impose property taxes on
vessels owned by a New York company and registered in New York as their
home port which engaged in the coastwise trade entailing calls at
California ports which were too brief to establish a tax situs.
Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., McLean, Wayne, Catron, Nelson,
Grier, Curtis, Campbell.
Justices Dissenting: Daniel.
34. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856).
Levy under an 1851 Ohio law of a bank tax at a higher rate than
that specified in the bank's charter in 1845 was invalid by reason of
impairment of the obligation of contract.
Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., McLean, Wayne, Nelson, Grier,
Curtis.
Justices Dissenting: Catron, Daniel, Campbell.
35. Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227 (1860).
An Alabama statute requiring owners of steamboats navigating the
waters of that State to register under the penalty of a $500 fine
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for each offense was in conflict with the act of Congress providing for
the enrollment and license of vessels engaged in the coastwise trade and
therefore inoperative.
Accord: Foster v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 244 (1860), which
held that this statute also was inoperative when applied to a lighter
and a towboat assisting the movement wholly within Alabama territorial
waters of vessels engaged in foreign and interstate commerce.
36. Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169 (1861).
A California stamp tax imposed on bills of lading for gold or
silver transported from California to any place outside the State was
void as a tax on exports forbidden by Art. I, Sec. 10, cl. 2 of the
Constitution.
37. Howard v. Bugbee, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 461 (1861).
An Alabama statute authorizing redemption of mortgaged property
in two years after sale under a foreclosure decree, by bona fide
creditors of the mortgagor could not be applied to sales under mortgages
executed prior to the enactment without invalid impairment of the
obligation of contracts (Art. I, Sec. 10).
38. Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 620 (1863).
Securities of the United States being exempt from state
taxation, inclusion of the value thereof in the capital of a bank
subjected to taxation by the terms of a New York law rendered the latter
void.
Accord: Bank Tax Case, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 200 (1865).
39. Hawthorne v. Calef, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 10 (1865).
A Maine statute terminating the liability of corporate stock for
the debts of the corporation impaired the obligation of contracts as
respects claims of creditors outstanding at the time of such
termination.
40. The Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51 (1866).
An obligation of contract was impaired when a state legislature,
after having issued a charter to a bridge company containing assurances
that erection of other bridges within two miles of said bridge would not
be authorized, subsequently chartered a second company to construct a
bridge within a few rods of the first.
41. Van Allen v. The Assessors, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573 (1866).
A New York law authorizing localities to tax as personal
property national bank stock held by residents, but which imposed no
comparable tax on shares of state banks, was violative of federal
legislation authorizing state taxation of national bank stock at rates
no higher than those imposed on state bank shares. Taxation of the
capital of state banks did not provide such equality, for that part of
the capital of state banks invested in federal securities was exempt.
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Justices Concurring: Grier, Davis, Nelson, Clifford, Miller, Field.
Justices Dissenting: Chase, C.J., Wayne, Swayne.
42. Accord: Bradley v. Illinois, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 459 (1867), voiding a
similar Illinois tax law on the ground that a tax on the capital
of state banks was not the equivalent of the state tax on shares
of national banks and accordingly the tax on the latter was in
conflict with federal law consenting to taxation of national
bank shares at rates not in excess of those imposed on shares of
state banks.
43. McGee v. Mathis, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 143 (1867).
Arkansas statute of 1855 repealing an 1851 grant of tax
exemption applicable to swamp lands, paid for either before or after
repeal with scrip issued before the repeal, impaired a contract of the
State with holders of such scrip (Art. I, Sec. 10).
44. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
Missouri constitutional provisions which required clergymen, as
a prerequisite to the practice of their profession, to take an oath that
they had never been guilty of hostility to the United States, or of
certain other acts which were lawful when committed, was void as a bill
of attainder and as an ex post facto law.
Justices Concurring: Wayne, Grier, Nelson, Clifford, Field.
Justices Dissenting: Swayne, Davis, Miller.
45. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867).
A California statute vesting state courts with in rem
jurisdiction over vessels for causes of action cognizable in admiralty
invalidly infringed the admiralty jurisdiction exclusively conferred
upon federal courts by Sec. 9 of the Judiciary Act.
46. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867).
Illinois law limiting taxing powers granted to a municipality
under a prior law authorizing it to issue bonds and amortize the same by
levy of taxes impaired the obligation of contract (Art. I, Sec. 10).
47. The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867).
Iowa statute providing an in rem remedy in state courts for
maritime causes of action was void by reason of conflict with Sec. 9 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 which vested admiralty jurisdiction
exclusively in the federal courts.
48. Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1867).
A Mississippi statute which prohibited enforcement of a judgment
of a sister State against a resident of Mississippi whenever barred by
the Mississippi statute of limitations was violative of the full faith
and credit clause of Art. IV.
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49. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867).
When a treaty with Indian tribes exempted their lands from levy,
sale, and forefeiture, a State could not validly collect its tax on
lands held in severalty by members of such tribes under patents issued
them pursuant to such treaty. Tribal Indians thus recognized by the
National Government are exempt from the jurisdiction of the State.
50. The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1867).
A New York statute imposing a tax on lands reserved to an Indian
tribe by treaty was void, notwithstanding provision therein that sale of
land for nonpayment of the tax would not affect the right of occupancy
by the Indians.
51. Steamship Company v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867).
A Louisiana statute which provided that port wardens might
collect, in addition to other fees, a tax of five dollars from every
ship entering the port of New Orleans, whether any service was performed
or not, was in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution
(Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3).
52. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
A Nevada tax collected from every person leaving the State by
rail or stage coach abridged the privileges of United States citizens to
move freely across state lines in fulfillment of their relations with
the National Government.
53. Bank v. Supervisors, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 26 (1868).
New York tax could not be collected on United States notes
expressly exempted from state taxation by federal law authorizing their
issuance as legal tender.
54. Northern Central Ry. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1869).
Pennsylvania was without jurisdiction to enforce its law taxing
interest on railway bonds secured by a mortgage applicable to railway
property part of which was located in another State.
Justices Concurring: Chase, C.J., Nelson, Davis, Field, Miller,
Grier.
Justices Dissenting: Clifford, Swayne.
55. The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624 (1869).
Inasmuch as a shipper's lien under a contract of carriage
between ports within the same State is a maritime lien enforceable by in
rem proceedings exclusively within the admiralty jurisdiction of federal
court, an Alabama law creating a maritime lien enforceable by in rem
proceedings in its own courts was void.
56. Furman v. Nichol, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 44 (1869).
Tennessee statute repealing prior law making notes of the Banks
of Tennessee receivable in payment of taxes impaired the obligation of
contract as to the notes already in circulation (Art. I, Sec. 10).
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57. Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430 (1869); The
Washington University v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 439 (1869).
Missouri statute taxing corporations afforded tax exemption by
their charter impaired the obligation of contract (Art. I, Sec. 10).
Justices Concurring: Nelson, Clifford, Grier, Swayne, Davis.
Justices Dissenting: Chase, C.J., Miller, Field.
58. State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204 (1871).
Alabama taxes levied on vessels owned by its citizens and
employed in intrastate commerce ``at so much per ton of the registered
tonnage'' were violative of the constitutional prohibition against the
levy of tonnage duties by States.
59. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871).
Maryland law which exacted a traders' license from nonresidents
at a higher rate than was collected from residents was violative of the
privileges and immunities clause of Art. IV, Sec. 2.
60. Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92 (1872).
State legislation cannot interfere with the disposition of the
public domain by Congress, and therefore a Missouri statute of
limitations, which was inapplicable to the United States, could not be
applied so as to accord title to an adverse possessor as against a
grantee from the United States, notwithstanding that the adverse
possession preceded the federal conveyance.
Justices Concurring: Field, Nelson, Swayne, Clifford, Miller,
Bradley, Chase, C.J.
Justices Dissenting: Davis, Strong.
61. Wilmington R.R. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 264 (1872).
North Carolina statute which levied a tax on the franchise and
property of a railroad which had been accorded tax exemption by the
terms of its charter impaired the obligation of contract.
62. White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1872).
Obligations of contracts clause (Art. I, Sec. 10) precluded
reliance on a Georgia constitutional provision of 1868, prohibiting
enforcement of any contract, the consideration for which was a slave, to
defeat enforcement of a note based on such consideration and negotiated
prior to adoption of said provision.
Justices Concurring: Swayne, Nelson, Davis, Strong, Clifford,
Miller, Field, Bradley.
Justice Dissenting: Chase, C.J.
63. Accord: Osborne v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654 (1872),
invalidating a similar Arkansas constitutional provision adopted
in 1868.
Justices Concurring: Swayne, Nelson, Davis, Strong, Clifford,
Miller, Field, Bradley.
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Justice Dissenting: Chase, C.J.
64. Delmas v. Insurance Company, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 661 (1872).
A Louisiana constitutional provision rendering unenforceable
contracts, the consideration for which was Confederate money, was
inapplicable, by reason of the obligation of contracts clause of the
Federal Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 10) to contracts consummated before
adoption of the former provision.
65. Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873).
A Pennsylvania law which imposed a tax on freight transported
interstate, into and out of Pennsylvania, was an invalid regulation of
interstate commerce.
Justices Concurring: Story, Chase, C.J., Clifford, Miller, Field,
Bradley, Hunt.
Justices Dissenting: Swayne, Davis.
66. State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300 (1873).
Pennsylvania law, so far as it directed domestic corporations to
withhold on behalf of the State a portion of interest due on bonds owned
by nonresidents, impaired the obligation of contract and denied due
process by taxing property beyond its jurisdiction.
Justices Concurring: Field, Chase, C.J., Bradley, Swayne, Strong.
Justices Dissenting: Davis, Clifford, Miller, Hunt.
67. Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1873).
Georgia constitutional provision increasing amount of homestead
exemption impaired the obligation of contract, insofar as it applied to
a judgment obtained under a less liberal exemption provision.
68. Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1873).
A West Virginia Act of 1865, depriving defendants of right to
rehearing on a judgment obtained under an earlier law unless they made
oath that they had not committed certain offenses, constituted an
invalid bill of attainder and ex post facto law.
Justices Concurring: Field, Chase, C.J., Clifford, Miller, Swayne,
Davis, Strong, Hunt.
Justice Dissenting: Bradley.
69. Humphrey v. Pegues, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 244 (1873).
South Carolina taxing laws, as applied to a railroad whose
charter exempted it from taxation, impaired the obligation of contract.
70. Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 314 (1873).
Georgia law restricting remedies for obtaining a judgment, so
far as it affected prior contracts, impaired the obligation of contract.
71. Barings v. Dabney, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 1 (1873).
South Carolina act appropriating for payment of state debts the
assets of an insolvent bank, in which the State owned all the stock,
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disadvantaged private creditors of the bank and thereby impaired the
obligation of contract.
72. Peete v. Morgan, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 581 (1874).
Texas act of 1870 imposing a tonnage tax on foreign vessels to
defray quarantine expenses held violative of Art I, Sec. 10, prohibiting
levy without consent of Congress.
73. Pacific R.R. v. Maguire, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 36 (1874).
Missouri law which levied a tax on railroad prior to expiration
of a grant of exemption impaired obligation of contract.
Justices Concurring: Waite, C.J., Field, Bradley, Swayne, Davis,
Hunt.
Justices Dissenting: Clifford, Miller.
74. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
Wisconsin act admitting foreign insurance companies to transact
business within the State, upon their agreement not to remove suits to
federal courts, exacted an unconstitutional condition.
Justices Concurring: Clifford, Miller, Field, Bradley, Swayne,
Strong, Hunt.
Justices Dissenting: Waite, C.J., Davis.
75. Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875).
Kansas act of 1872, authorizing municipalities to issue bonds
repayable out of tax revenues in support of private enterprise, amounted
to collection of money in aid of a private, rather than public purpose,
and was violative of due process.
Justices Concurring: Strong, Swayne, Davis, Waite, C.J., Miller,
Field, Bradley.
Justice Dissenting: Clifford.
76. Wilmington & Weldon R.R. v. King, 91 U.S. 3 (1875).
North Carolina statute, insofar as it authorized a jury in suits
on contracts--negotiated previously during the Civil War--to place their
own estimates upon the value of the contract instead of taking the value
stipulated by the parties, impaired the obligation of such contracts.
Justices Concurring: Waite, C.J., Clifford, Miller, Field, Swayne,
Davis, Strong, Hunt.
Justice Dissenting: Bradley.
77. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
Missouri act which required payment of a license fee by peddlers
of merchandise produced outside the State, but exempted peddlers of
State-produced merchandise, imposed an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce.
78. Morrill v. Wisconsin, 154 U.S. 626 (1877).
Wisconsin statute void on basis of Welton v. Missouri.
[[Page 2047]]
79. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876).
New York act of 1849, which required owner of ocean-going
passenger vessel to post bond of $300 for each passenger as surety
against their becoming public charges, or, in lieu thereof, to pay a tax
of $1.50 for each, contravened exclusive federal power to regulate
foreign commerce.
80. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876).
California law, which required master of vessel to post $500
bond for each alien ``lewd and debauched female'' passenger landed,
contravened the federal power to regulate foreign commerce.
81. Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238 (1877).
New York act of 1865, providing for collection from docking
vessels of a fee measured by tonnage, imposed tonnage duty in violation
of Art. I, Sec. 10.
82. Foster v. Masters of New Orleans, 94 U.S. 246 (1877).
Louisiana statute requiring survey of hatches of every sea-going
vessel arriving at New Orleans, contravened the federal power to
regulate foreign and interstate commerce.
83. New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104 (1877).
Statute increasing tax above rate stipulated in State's contract
with railroad corporations impaired the obligation of contract.
84. Railroad Co.v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1878).
Missouri act prohibiting the bringing of cattle into the State
between March and November contravened the power of Congress over
interstate commerce.
85. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
Louisiana Reconstruction Act, prohibiting interstate common
carriers of passengers from making any discrimination on the basis of
race or color, held invalid as a regulation of interstate commerce.
86. Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679 (1878).
Tennessee law increasing the tax on a bank above the rate
specified in its charter, held to impair the obligation of that
contract.
Concurring: Justices Swayne, Miller, Hunt, Bradley, Harlan, and
Chief Justice Waite.
Dissenting: Justices Strong, Clifford, and Field.
87. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878).
Florida legislative grant of a telegraphic monopoly held
``inoperative'' as in conflict with a congressional act dealing with the
construction of telegraph lines and based on its commerce and postal
power.
[[Page 2048]]
Concurring: Chief Justice Waite, Justices Clifford, Strong, Bradley,
Swayne, and Miller.
Dissenting: Justices Field, Hunt.
88. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1878).
North Carolina constitutional provision increasing amount of
debtor's property exempt from sale under execution of a judgment
impaired the obligation of contracts negotiated prior to its adoption.
Concurring: Chief Justice Waite, Justices Swayne, Bradley, Strong,
Miller.
Concurring specially: Justices Field, Hunt.
Dissenting: Justice Harlan.
89. Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454 (1878).
Provision of the Tennessee Constitution of 1865, forbidding the
receipt for taxes of the bills of the Bank of Tennessee and declaring
the issues of the bank during the insurrectionary period void, held to
impair the obligation of contract.
Concurring: Justices Miller, Clifford, Strong, Hunt, Swayne, Field.
Dissenting: Chief Justice Waite, Justices Bradley, Harlan.
90. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566 (1878).
Pennsylvania act taxing auction sales, when applied to sales of
imported goods in the original packages, was void as a duty on imports
and a regulation of foreign commerce.
91. Northwestern University v. Illinois ex rel. Miller, 99 U.S. 309
(1878).
Revenue law of Illinois, so far as it modified tax exemptions
granted to Northwestern University by an earlier statute, impaired the
obligation of contract.
92. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
West Virginia law barring Negroes from jury service violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Concurring: Justices Strong, Miller, Hunt, Swayne, Bradley, Harlan,
Chief Justice Waite.
Dissenting: Justices Field, Clifford.
93. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1880).
Maryland statute and Baltimore ordinance, levying tax solely on
products of other States, held to impose an invalid burden upon foreign
and interstate commerce.
Concurring: Justices Harlan, Hunt, Clifford, Strong, Miller, Swayne,
Field, Bradley.
Dissenting: Chief Justice Waite.
94. Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123 (1880).
Texas statute, insofar as it levied occupational tax only upon
sale of out-of-state beer and wine, was violative of the federal power
to regulate foreign and interstate commerce.
[[Page 2049]]
95. Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U.S. 672 (1880).
Virginia act, adopted subsequently to law providing for issuance
of bonds and acceptance of interest coupons thereon in full payment of
taxes, which levied a new property tax collectible by way of deduction
from such interest coupons, impaired the obligation of contract.
Concurring: Justices Field, Clifford, Harlan, Strong, Hunt, Swayne,
Bradley, Chief Justice Waite.
Dissenting: Justice Miller.
96. Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U.S. 5 (1880).
Wisconsin act which repealed prior statute authorizing payment
of fixed sum for performance of a contract to complete a geological
survey, impaired the obligation of contract, notwithstanding that the
second act was enacted prior to total fulfillment of the contract.
97. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 (1881).
Virginia license acts, requiring a license for sale of goods
made outside the State but not within the State, held in conflict with
the commerce clause.
98. United States ex rel. Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1881).
Louisiana act withdrawing from New Orleans the power to levy
taxes adequate to amortize previously issued bonds impaired the
obligation of contract.
Accord: Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278 (1881).
99. Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 U.S. 362 (1881).
The general taxing laws for New Orleans when applied to the
property of an asylum, whose charter exempted it from taxation, impaired
the obligation of contract.
Justices Concurring: Bradley, Waite, C.J., Woods, Gray, Harlan,
Matthews, Blatchford.
Justices Dissenting: Miller, Field.
100. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1882).
Texas tax collected on private telegraph messages sent out of
the State imposed an invalid burden on foreign and interstate commerce;
and insofar as it was imposed on official messages sent by federal
officers amounted to an unconstitutional burden on a federal
instrumentality.
101. Ralls County Court v. United States, 105 U.S. 733 (1881).
Missouri law which deprived a county of the taxing power
requisite to meet interest payments on previously issued bonds impaired
the obligation of contract.
102. Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487 (1882).
West Virginia law authorizing a city to issue its bonds in aid
of manufacturers was void by reason of sanctioning an expenditure of
[[Page 2050]]
public funds for a private purpose contrary to the requirements of due
process.
103. New York v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59 (1882).
New York law imposing a tax on every alien arriving from a
foreign country, and holding the vessel liable for payment of the tax
was an invalid regulation of foreign commerce.
104. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883).
A Missouri law which abolished a rule existing at the time the
crime was committed, whereunder subsequent prosecution for first degree
murder was precluded after conviction for second degree murder has been
set aside on appeal, was void as an ex post facto law.
Concurring: Justices Miller, Harlan, Field, Blatchford, Woods.
Dissenting: Justices Matthews, Bradley, Gray, Chief Justice Waite.
105. Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U.S. 716 (1884).
Louisiana act repealing taxing authority of a municipality to
pay judgments hitherto rendered against it impaired the obligation of
contract.
106. Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885).
Missouri act authorizing city to issue bonds in aid of
manufacturing corporations was void by reason of sanctioning defrayment
of public moneys for other than public purpose and depriving taxpayers
of property without due process.
107. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196 (1885).
Pennsylvania taxing laws, when applied to the capital stock of a
New Jersey ferry corporation carrying on no business in the State except
the landing and receiving of passengers and freight, was void as a tax
on interstate commerce.
108. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885).
Virginia act which terminated privilege accorded bondholders
under prior law of tendering coupons from said bonds in payment of taxes
impaired the obligation of contract (Art. I, Sec. 10).
Concurring: Justices Matthews, Field, Harlan, Woods, Blatchford.
Dissenting: Justices Bradley, Miller, Gray, Chief Justice Waite.
109. Effinger v. Kenney, 115 U.S. 566 (1885).
Virginia Act of 1867, which provided that in suits to enforce
contracts for the sale of property negotiated during the Civil War and
payable in Confederate notes, the measure of recovery was to be the
value of the land at the time of sale rather than the value of such
notes at that time, impaired the obligation of contracts (Art. I,
Sec. 10).
[[Page 2051]]
110. Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U.S. 683 (1885).
Act of 1872 chartering and authorizing a corporation to supply
gas in Louisville, Kentucky, impaired the obligation of contract
resulting from the grant of an exclusive privilege to an older company
in 1869.
111. Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131 (1885).
When a public officer has completed services (1871-1874), for
which the compensation was fixed by law, an implied obligation to pay
him at such rate arises, and such contract was impaired by a Louisiana
constitutional provision of 1880 which reduced the taxing power of a
parish to such extent as to deprive the officer of any effective means
of collecting the sum due him.
112. Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886).
Alabama law which deprived Mobile and its successor of the power
to levy taxes sufficient to amortize previously issued bonds impaired
the obligation of contracts.
113. Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446 (1886).
Michigan law taxing nonresidents soliciting sale of foreign
liquors to be shipped into the State imposed an invalid restraint on
interstate commerce.
114. Royall v. Virginia, 116 U.S. 572 (1886).
When a Virginia law provided that coupons on state bonds were
acceptable in payment of state fees, subsequent law requiring legal
tender in payment of a professional license fee impaired the obligation
of contract between the coupon holder and the State and also voided
invocation of another law imposing penalty for practice without a
license (refused for want of payment in legal tender).
115. Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U.S. 34 (1886).
Tennessee privilege tax on railway sleeping cars was void
insofar as it applied to cars moving in interstate commerce.
116. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886).
A State cannot validly sell for taxes lands which the United
States owned at the time the taxes were levied, but in which it ceased
to have an interest at the time of sale (Art. VI).
117. Sprague v. Thompson, 118 U.S. 90 (1886).
Georgia law requiring out-of-state coastal vessels, subject to
certain discriminating exemptions, to take on a pilot upon entering
Georgia ports, was void by reason of conflict with federal pilotage law.
[[Page 2052]]
118. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
Illinois law, prohibiting long-short haul rate discrimination,
when applied to interstate transportation, encroached upon the federal
commerce power.
Concurring: Justices Miller, Field, Harlan, Woods, Matthews,
Blatchford.
Dissenting: Justices Bradley, Gray, Chief Justice Waite.
119. Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
Tennessee law taxing drummers not operating from a domestic
licensed place of business, insofar as it applied to drummers soliciting
sales of goods on behalf of out-of-state business firms, was an invalid
regulation of interstate commerce.
Concurring: Justices Bradley, Miller, Harlan, Woods, Matthews,
Blatchford.
Dissenting: Chief Justice Waite, Justices Gray, Field.
120. Corson v. Maryland, 120 U.S. 502 (1887).
Maryland law licensing salesmen, insofar as it was applied to a
New York resident soliciting orders on behalf of a New York firm, was an
invalid regulation of interstate commerce.
121. Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186 (1887).
Iowa law, conditioning admission of a foreign corporation to do
local business on surrender of right to invoke the diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction of federal courts exacted an invalid forfeiture
of a constitutional right.
122. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230 (1887).
Michigan act, insofar as it taxed the gross receipts of
companies and corporations engaged in interstate commerce, was held to
be in conflict with the commerce powers of Congress.
123. Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U.S. 284 (1887).
Missouri law requiring certain petitions, not exacted when
county bonds were issued, before taxes could be levied to amortize said
bonds, impaired the obligation of contracts.
124. Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887).
Pennsylvania gross receipts tax on public utilities, insofar as
it was applied to the gross receipts of a domestic corporation derived
from transportation of persons and property on the high seas, was in
conflict with the exclusive federal power to regulate foreign and
interstate commerce.
125. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347 (1887).
Indiana statute concerning the delivery of telegrams, so far as
applied to deliveries sent from Indiana to other States, was an invalid
regulation of commerce.
[[Page 2053]]
126. Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
Iowa liquor statute requiring interstate carriers to procure a
certificate from the auditor of the county of destination before
bringing liquor into the State, was violative of the commerce clause.
Concurring: Justices Matthews, Field (separately), Miller, Bradley,
Blatchford.
Dissenting: Justices Harlan, Gray, Chief Justice Waite.
127. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U.S. 530 (1888).
Massachusetts law, authorizing an injunction to restrain tax
delinquents from doing business until payments are made, could not be
validly invoked to restrain a telegraph company operating lines over
United States military and post roads pursuant to federal authorization.
128. California v. Pacific R.R., 127 U.S. 1 (1888).
Unless Congress consents, a state tax, levied on the franchise
of interstate railway corporations chartered by Congress pursuant to its
commerce power, is void.
129. Ratterman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 127 U.S. 411 (1888).
An Ohio law which levied a tax on the receipts of a telegraph
company was invalid to the extent that part of such receipts levied on
were derived from interstate commerce.
130. Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129 (1888).
By reason of conflict with the federal power to regulate
interstate commerce, a Texas law which imposed a license tax on drummers
could not validly be enforced against one who solicited orders for the
purchase of merchandise from out-of-state sellers.
131. Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889).
Clause of the District act requiring commercial agents selling
by sample to pay a license tax, held a regulation of interstate commerce
when applied to agents soliciting purchases on behalf of principals
outside of the District of Columbia.
Concurring: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Field, Bradley, Harlan,
Matthews, Gray, Blatchford, Lamar.
Dissenting: Justice Miller.
132. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 132 U.S. 472 (1889).
Alabama tax law, as applied to revenue of telegraph company made
by sending messages outside the State, was held to be an invalid
regulation of commerce.
133. Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
Colorado law, when applied to a person convicted of a murder
committed prior to the enactment and which increased the penalty to be
imposed, was void as an ex post facto law.
[[Page 2054]]
Concurring: Justices Miller, Field, Harlan, Gray, Blatchford, Lamar,
Chief Justice Fuller.
Dissenting: Justices Brewer, Bradley.
134. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
State rate regulatory law which empowered a commission to
establish rate schedules that were final and not subject to judicial
review as to their reasonableness was violative of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Concurring: Justices Blatchford, Miller, Field, Harlan, Brewer,
Chief Justice Fuller.
Dissenting: Justices Bradley, Gray, Lamar.
135. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
Iowa prohibition law, enforced as to an interstate shipment of
liquor in the original packages or kegs, was violative of the federal
power to regulate interstate commerce.
Concurring: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Miller, Field, Bradley,
Blatchford, Lamar.
Dissenting: Justices Gray, Harlan, Brewer.
136. Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U.S. 161 (1890).
Michigan statute taxing sale of imported liquor in original
package, held invalid regulation of interstate commerce.
Concurring: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Miller, Field, Bradley,
Blatchford, Lamar.
Dissenting: Justices Gray, Harlan, Brewer.
137. McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662 (1890).
Virginia acts which stipulated that if the genuineness of
coupons tendered in payment of taxes was in issue, the bond from which
the coupon was cut must be produced, which precluded use of expert
testimony to establish the genuineness of the coupons, and which, in
suits for payment of taxes, imposed on the defendant tendering coupons
as payment the burden of establishing the validity of said coupons, were
deemed to abridge the remedies available to the bondholders so
materially as to impair the obligation of contract.
138. Norfolk & Western R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U.S. 114 (1890).
Pennsylvania act, imposing a license tax on foreign corporation
common carrier doing business in the State, was held to be invalid as a
tax on interstate commerce.
Concurring: Justices Lamar, Miller, Field, Bradley, Harlan,
Blatchford.
Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Gray, Brewer.
139. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890).
Minnesota statute, which made it illegal to offer for sale any
meat other than that taken from animals passed by state inspectors,
[[Page 2055]]
held to discriminate against meat producers from other States and to
place an undue burden upon interstate commerce.
140. Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891).
Virginia statute prohibiting sale of meat killed 100 miles or
more from place of sale, unless it was first inspected in Virginia, held
void as interference with interstate commerce and imposing a
discriminatory tax.
141. Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891).
Oregon act of 1887 which voided all certificates for the sale of
public land unless 20% of the purchase price had been paid prior to 1879
altered the terms of purchase provided under preexisting law and
therefore impaired the obligations of the contract.
142. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891).
Kentucky law, which required license from foreign express
corporation agents before doing business in the State, was held invalid
under the commerce clause.
Concurring: Justices Bradley, Field, Harlan, Blatchford, Lamar,
Brewer.
Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justice Gray.
143. Voight v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62 (1891).
Virginia statute which required state inspection of all but
domestic flour held invalid under commerce clause.
144. Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486 (1894).
Tennessee statutes which levied taxes on a railroad company
enjoying tax exemption under an earlier charter impaired the obligation
of contract.
Concurring: Justices Jackson, Field, Harlan, Brown, White.
Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Gray, Brewer, Shiras.
145. New York, L. E. & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U.S. 628 (1894).
Pennsylvania act of 1885 which required a New York corporation,
when paying interest in New York City on its outstanding securities, to
withhold a Pennsylvania tax levied on resident owners of such securities
was violative of due process by reason of its application to property
beyond the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania. The act also impaired the
obligation of contracts by increasing the conditions originally exacted
of the railroad in return for permission to construct and operate over
trackage in Pennsylvania.
146. Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204 (1894).
Kentucky act regulating toll rates on bridge across the Ohio
River held unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce.
Concurring: Justices Brown, Harlan, Brewer, Shiras, Jackson.
[[Page 2056]]
Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Field, Gray, White.
147. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98 (1895).
Texas statute regulating railroad rates, when applied to
interstate freight transportation, was held to conflict with Interstate
Commerce Act.
148. Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U.S. 134 (1896).
Tennessee revenue laws which imposed a tax on stock beyond that
stipulated under the provision of a state charter held to impair the
obligation of contracts.
149. Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118 (1896).
Kansas law granting to mortgagor a right, not existent when the
mortgage was negotiated, namely, a right to redeem foreclosed property,
impaired the obligation of contracts.
150. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142 (1896).
Illinois statute required railroad to run New Orleans train into
Cairo and back to mail line, although there was already adequate service
to Cairo. This requirement was held to be an unconstitutional
obstruction of interstate commerce and of passage of United States
mails.
151. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
A railroad was deprived of property without due process of law
by a Nebraska statute which compelled it to permit a third party to
erect a grain elevator on its right of way.
152. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897).
South Carolina act regulating sale of alcoholic beverages
exclusively at state dispensaries, when enforced against a resident
importing out-of-state liquor, constituted an invalid discriminatory
regulation of interstate commerce.
Concurring: Justices Shiras, Field, Harlan, Gray, White, Peckham,
Fuller.
Dissenting: Justice Brown.
153. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
Texas law which required railroads to pay court costs and
attorneys' fees to litigants successfully prosecuting claims against
them deprived the railroads of due process and equal protection of the
law.
Concurring: Justices Brewer, Field, Harlan, Brown, Shiras, Peckham.
Dissenting: Justices Gray, White, Chief Juxtice Fuller.
154. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
Louisiana law imposing penalty for soliciting contract of
insurance on behalf of insurers which have not complied with Louisiana
law effected a denial of liberty of contract contrary to due process
[[Page 2057]]
when applied to an insurance contract negotiated in New York with a New
York company and with premiums and losses to be paid in New York.
155. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
Nebraska statute setting intrastate freight rates held to impose
rates so low as to be unreasonable and to amount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law.
156. Houston & Texas Central Ry. v. Texas, 170 U.S. 243 (1898).
Texas constitutional provision, as enforced to recover certain
sections of land held by a railroad company under a previous legislative
grant, judged an impairment of obligation of contract.
157. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
Provision in Utah constitution, providing for the trial of non-
capital criminal cases in courts of general jurisdiction by a jury of
eight persons, held an ex post facto law applied to felonies committed
before the territory became a State.
Concurring: Justices Harlan, Gray, Brown, Shiras, White, McKenna,
Chief Juxtice Fuller.
Dissenting: Justices Brewer, Peckham.
158. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898).
Pennsylvania law which prohibited the manufacture and sale of
oleomargarine was invalid to the extent that it prohibited interstate
importation and resale of oleomargarine in original packages.
Concurring: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Brewer, Brown, Shiras,
White, Peckham, McKenna.
Dissenting: Justices Gray, Harlan.
159. Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U.S. 30 (1898).
New Hampshire law which prohibited the sale of oleomargarine
unless it was pink in color, was invalid as an arbitrary means of
rendering the product unmarketable and also could not be enforced to
prevent the interstate transportation and resale of oleomargarine
produced in another State and not colored pink.
Concurring: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Brewer, Brown, Shiras,
White, Peckham, McKenna.
Dissenting: Justices Harlan, Gray.
160. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
Tennessee acts which granted Tennessee creditors priority over
non-resident creditors having claims against foreign corporations
admitted to do local business infringed the privileges and immunities
clause of Art. IV, Sec. 2.
Concurring: Justices Harlan, Gray, Brown, Shiras, White, McKenna,
Peckham.
[[Page 2058]]
Dissenting: Justice Brewer, Chief Justice Fuller.
161. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898).
The exaction, as authorized by Ohio law, from the owner of
property, via special assessment, of the cost of a public improvement in
substantial excess of the benefits accruing to him amounted to a taking
of property for public use without compensation and was violative of due
process.
Concurring: Justices Harlan, Brown, White, Peckham, McKenna, Chief
Justice Fuller.
Dissenting: Justices Brewer, Gray, Shiras.
162. Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193 (1899).
Nonresident owner of property in Iowa was deprived of property
without due process when the State, without having acquired personal
jurisdiction via service of process, subjected him to a personal
liability to pay a special assessment in conformity with a statute
invalidly authorizing imposition of liability in such manner.
163. Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899).
Ohio statute which regulated the use of oleomargarine in the
State held void as applied to a soldiers' home in Ohio created by
Congress and administered as a federal institution.
164. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684 (1899).
Michigan act which required railroads to sell 1,000-mile tickets
at a fixed price in favor of the purchaser, his wife, and children, with
provisions for forfeiture if presented by any other person in payment of
fare, and for expiration within two years, subject to redemption of
unused portion and collection of 3 cents per mile already traveled,
effected a taking of property without due process and a denial of equal
protection.
Concurring: Justices Peckham, Harlan, Brewer, Brown, Shiras, White.
Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Gray, McKenna.
165. Houston & Texas Central R.R. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 66 (1900).
Subsequent repeal of a Texas statute which permitted treasury
warrants to be given to the State for payment of interest on bonds
issued by a railroad and held by the State, with accompanying endeavor
to hold the railroad liable for back interest paid on the warrants, was
invalid by reason of impairment of the obligation of contract.
166. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Illinois, 177 U.S. 514 (1900).
Illinois law which required all regular passenger trains to stop
at county seats for receipt and discharge of passengers imposed an
invalid burden on interstate commerce when applied to an express train
serving only through passengers between New York and St. Louis.
[[Page 2059]]
167. Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1900).
State statute repealing all former tax exemption laws and
providing for the taxation of lands granted to railroads held to impair
the obligation of contracts.
Duluth & I. R.R. v. St. Louis County, 179 U.S. 302 (1900).
Act of Minnesota legislature providing ways in which railroad
corporations could discharge property taxes held void under the ruling
in Stearns v. Minnesota.
168. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
Kansas statute, regulating public stock yards, violates the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it applied
only to one stockyard company in the State.
169. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Eubank, 184 U.S. 27 (1902).
Section of Kentucky constitution on long and short haul railroad
rates held invalid where interstate shipments were involved.
Concurring: Justices Peckham, Harlan, Brown, Shiras, White, McKenna,
Chief Justice Fuller.
Dissenting: Justices Brewer, Gray.
170. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
Act of Illinois, which regulated monopolies but exempted
agricultural products and livestock in the hands of the producer from
the operation of the law, held to deny the equal protection of the laws.
Concurring: Justices Harlan, Brewer, Brown, Shiras, White, Peckham,
Chief Justice Fuller.
Dissenting: Justice McKenna.
171. Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U.S. 27 (1902).
Tennessee license tax on agent soliciting and selling by sample
for company in another State held invalid regulation of commerce.
172. Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903).
An Indiana franchise granted to a Kentucky corporation for
operating a ferry from the Indiana to the Kentucky shore had its tax
situs in Indiana; and, accordingly, Kentucky lacked jurisdiction with
the result that its law which authorized a levy thereon effected a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Concurring: Justices Harlan, Brewer, Brown, White, Peckham, McKenna,
Holmes.
Dissenting: Justice Shiras, Chief Justice Fuller.
173. The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185 (1903).
Washington law which accorded contractor or subcontractor a lien
on a foreign vessel for work done and which made no provision for
protection of owner in event contractor was fully paid before notice of
[[Page 2060]]
subcontractor's lien was received deprived the owner of normal defenses
and constituted an invalid interference with admiralty jurisdiction
exclusively vested in federal courts by Art. III.
174. The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903).
New York statutes giving a lien for repairs upon vessels and
providing for the enforcement of such liens by proceedings in rem, held
void as in conflict with the exclusive admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Concurring: Justices Brown, White, McKenna, Holmes, Day.
Dissenting: Justices Brewer, Peckham, Harlan, Chief Justice Fuller.
175. Allen v. Pullman Company, 191 U.S. 171 (1903).
Tennessee tax of $500 per year per pullman car, when applied to
cars moving in interstate as well as intrastate commerce, imposed an
invalid burden on interstate commerce.
176. Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U.S. 1 (1904).
Illinois law, passed after a mortgage was executed, which
provided that if a mortgagee did not obtain a deed within five years
after the period of redemption had lapsed, he lost the estate (whereas
under the law existing when the mortgage was executed, failure by the
mortgagee to take out a deed had no effect on the title of the mortgagee
against the mortgagor) was held void as impairing the obligation of
contract and depriving the mortgagee of property rights without due
process.
177. Central of Georgia Ry. v. Murphey, 196 U.S. 194 (1905).
Sections of Georgia code, imposing the duty on common carriers
of reporting on the shipment of freight to the shipper, held void when
applied to interstate shipments.
178. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
New York law establishing 10-hour day in bakeries was violative
of due process by reason of interfering with the employees' freedom to
contract in relation to their labor.
Concurring: Justices Peckham, Brewer, Brown, McKenna, Fuller.
Dissenting: Justices Harlan, White, Day, Holmes (separately).
179. Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
Inasmuch as tangible personal property acquires a tax situs in
the State where it is permanently located, attempt by Kentucky, in which
the owner was domiciled, to tax railway cars located in Indiana, was
void and amounted to a deprivation of property without due process.
Concurring: Justices Brown, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, McKenna, Day.
Dissenting: Justices Holmes, White, Chief Justice Fuller.
[[Page 2061]]
180. Houston & Texas Central R.R. v. Mayes, 201 U.S. 321 (1906).
Texas statute exacting of an interstate railroad an absolute
requirement that it furnish a certain number of cars on a given day to
transport merchandise to another State imposed an invalid, unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce.
Concurring: Justices Brewer, Brown, Peckham, Holmes, Day.
Dissenting: Justices Harlan, McKenna, Chief Justice Fuller.
181. Powers v. Detroit & Grand Haven Ry., 201 U.S. 543 (1906).
When a railroad is reorganized under a special act but no new
corporation is chartered, tax concession granted by such act amounted to
a contract which could not be impaired by subsequent enactment which
purported to alter the rate of the tax.
Concurring: Justices Brewer, Harlan, Brown, Peckham, McKenna,
Holmes, Day, Chief Justice Fuller.
Dissenting: Justice White.
182. Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U.S. 453 (1906).
A water company owning an exclusive franchise to supply a city
with water was entitled to an injunction restraining impairment of such
contract by attempted erection by city of its own water system pursuant
to Mississippi statutory authorization.
Concurring: Justices Day, Brewer, Brown, White, Peckham, McKenna,
Holmes, Chiwf Justice Fuller.
Dissenting: Justice Harlan.
183. American Smelting Co. v. Colorado, 204 U.S. 103 (1907).
A statute stipulating that foreign corporations, as a condition
for admission to do business, pay a fee based on their capital stock
whereupon they would be subjected to all the liabilities and
restrictions imposed upon domestic corporations amounted to a contract,
the obligation of which was invalidly impaired by a later statute which
imposed higher annual license fees on foreign corporations admitted
under the preceding terms than were levied on domestic corporations,
whose corporate existence had not expired.
Concurring: Justices Peckham, Brewer, White, McKenna, Day.
Dissenting: Justices Harlan, Holmes, Moody, Chief Justice Fuller.
184. Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U.S. 503 (1907).
A state law levying a tax on a state bank, assessed on its
shares measured by the value of its capital, surplus, and individual
earnings, was void insofar as the assessment embraced federal bonds
owned by the bank and was in conflict with a federal enactment exempting
such bonds from state taxes.
Concurring: Justices Moody, Brewer, White, McKenna, Holmes, Day.
Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Harlan, Peckham.
[[Page 2062]]
185. Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U.S. 129 (1907).
Kentucky law proscribing C.O.D. shipments of liquor, providing
that the place where the money is paid or the goods delivered shall be
deemed to be the place of sale, and making the carrier jointly liable
with the vendor was, as applied to interstate shipments, an invalid
regulation of interstate commerce.
Concurring: Justices Brewer, Holmes, Peckham, Moody, White, Day,
McKenna, Chief Justice Fuller.
Dissenting: Justice Harlan.
Accord: American Express Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U.S. 139 (1907).
186. Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907).
Georgia statutory assessment procedure which afforded taxpayer
no opportunity to be heard as to valuation of property not returned by
him under honest belief that it was not taxable and which permitted him
to challenge the assessment only for fraud and corruption was violative
of the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
187. Darnell & Son v. Memphis, 208 U.S. 113 (1908).
Tennessee tax law which exempted domestic crops and manufactured
products while extending the levy to like products of out-of-state
origin imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce.
188. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Minnesota railroad rate statute which imposed such excessive
penalties that parties affected were deterred from testing its validity
in the courts denied a railroad the equal protection of the laws.
189. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1908).
Texas gross receipts tax insofar as it was levied on railroad
receipts which included income derived from interstate commerce was
invalid by reason of imposing a burden on interstate commerce.
Concurring: Justices Holmes, Brewer, Peckham, Day, Moody.
Dissenting: Justices Harlan, White, McKenna, Chief Justice Fuller.
190. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
New York law which required a public utility to perform its
service in such a manner that its entire plant would have to be rebuilt
at a cost on which no return could be obtained under the rates fixed
unconstitutionally deprived the utility of its property without due
process.
191. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Stock Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132
(1909).
Kentucky constitutional provision which required a carrier to
deliver its cars to connecting carriers without providing adequate
protection for their return or compensation for their use effected an
invalid taking of property without due process of law.
[[Page 2063]]
Concurring: Justices Holmes, Brewer, White, Peckham, Day, Chief
Justice Fuller.
Dissenting: Justices McKenna, Harlan, Moody.
192. Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909).
For want of jurisdiction, Oregon could not validly prosecute as
a violator of its law prohibiting the use of purse nets one who,
pursuant to a license from Washington, used such a net on the Washington
side of the Columbia River.
193. Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U.S. 218 (1909).
Kentucky law proscribing the sale of liquor to an inebriate, as
applied to a carrier delivering liquor to such person from another
State, was void by reason of conflict with the commerce clause.
Concurring: Justices Brewer, Holmes, Peckham, Moody, White, Day,
McKenna, Chief Justice Fuller.
Dissenting: Justice Harlan.
194. Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Orleans, 215 U.S. 170 (1909).
Louisiana act of 1870 providing for registration and collection
of judgments against New Orleans, so far as it delayed payment, or
collection of taxes for payment, of contract claims existing before its
passage, effected an invalid impairment of the obligation of such
contracts.
195. North Dakota ex rel. Flaherty v. Hanson, 215 U.S. 515 (1910).
North Dakota statute which required the recipient of a federal
retail liquor license, solely because of payment therefor and without
reference to the doing of any act within North Dakota, to publish
official notices of the terms of such license and of the place where it
is posted, to display on his premises an affidavit confirming such
publication, and to file an authenticated copy of such federal license
together with a $10 fee was void for imposing a burden on the federal
taxing power.
Concurring: Justices White, Harlan, Brewer, Day.
Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices McKenna, Holmes.
196. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910).
Kansas statute imposing a charter fee, computed as a percentage
of authorized capital stock, on corporations for the privilege of doing
business in Kansas could not validly be collected from a foreign
corporation engaged in interstate commerce, and also was violative of
due process insofar as it was imposed on property, part of which was
located beyond the limits of that State.
Concurring: Justices Harlan, Brewer, White (separately), Day, Moody.
Dissenting: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Peckham, Chief Justice Fuller.
[[Page 2064]]
197. Ludwig v. Western Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. 146 (1910).
Arkansas law which required a foreign corporation engaged in
interstate commerce to pay, as a license fee for doing an intrastate
business, a given amount of its entire capital stock, whether employed
in Arkansas or elsewhere, was void by reason of imposing a burden on
interstate commerce and embracing property outside the jurisdiction of
the State.
Concurring: Justices Harlan, Moody, Lurton, White, Day, Brewer.
Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices McKenna, Holmes.
198. Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910).
Alabama law which imposed on foreign corporations already
admitted to do business an additional franchise or privilege tax not
levied on domestic corporations exposed the foreign corporations to
denial of equal protection of the laws.
Concurring: Justices Day, Harlan, Brewer, White.
Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices McKenna, Holmes.
199. International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910).
Kansas, which by law exacted of foreign corporations engaged in
interstate commerce the following conditions for admission and retention
of the right to do business in that State, namely, procurement of a
license, submission of an annual financial statement, and which
prohibited them from filing actions in Kansas courts unless such
conditions were met, imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce.
Concurring: Justices Harlan, White, Holmes, Day, Lurton.
Dissenting: Chief Justice, Fuller, Justice McKenna.
200. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 136 (1910).
Arkansas law, and commission order issued under the authority
thereof, which required an interstate carrier, upon application of a
local shipper, to deliver promptly the number of freight cars requested
for loading purposes and which, without regard to the effect of such
demand on its interstate traffic, exposed it to severe penalties for
noncompliance, imposed an invalid, unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce. The rules of the American Railway Association as to
availability of a member carrier's cars for interstate shipments being a
matter of federal regulation, it was beyond the power of a state court
to pass on their sufficiency.
Concurring: Justices White, Harlan, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Lurton.
Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller.
201. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196 (1910).
Nebraska law compelling railroad, at its own expense, and upon
request of grain elevator operators, to install switches connecting
[[Page 2065]]
such elevators with its right of way deprived the carrier of property
without due process of law.
Concurring: Justices Holmes, White, Day, Lurton, Chief Justice
Fuller.
Dissenting: Justices Harlan, McKenna.
202. Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U.S. 124 (1910).
Alabama law which imposed license tax on agents, not having a
permanent place of business in that State and soliciting orders for the
purchase and delivery of pictures and frames manufactured in, and
delivered from, another State, with the title remaining in the vendor
until the agent collected the purchase price, imposed an invalid burden
on interstate commercial transactions.
203. Herndon v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 218 U.S. 135 (1910).
When a railroad already has provided adequate accommodations at
any point, a Missouri regulation which required interstate trains to
stop at such point imposed an invalid, unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce. Also, a Missouri law which forfeited the right of an admitted
foreign carrier to do a local business upon its instituting a right of
action in a federal court extracted an unconstitutional condition.
204. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
Alabama law which made a refusal to perform labor contracted
for, without return of money or property advanced under the contract,
prima facie evidence of fraud and which was enforced under local rules
of evidence which precluded one accused thereof from testifying as to
uncommunicated motives was an invalid peonage law proscribed by the
Thirteenth Amendment.
Concurring: Justices Hughes, Lamar, Harlan, Day, Van Devanter,
McKenna, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Lurton.
205. Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas. Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
Oklahoma law which withheld from foreign corporations engaged in
interstate commerce a privilege afforded domestic corporations engaged
in local commerce, namely, of building pipe lines across its highways
and transporting to points outside its boundaries natural gas extracted
and reduced to possession therein, was invalid as a restraint on
interstate commerce and as a deprivation of property without due process
of law.
Concurring: Justices McKenna, Harlan, Day, Van Devanter, Lamar,
Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Lurton, Hughes.
206. Berryman v. Whitman College, 222 U.S. 334 (1912).
Although the federal organic act of 1867 forbade the Washington
territorial legislature from granting tax exemption privileges to pri
[[Page 2066]]
vate corporations, the territorial acts of 1859, as amended by an act of
1883 which accorded a tax exemption to Whitman College, gave rise to a
contract which was impaired by the act of the state legislature, enacted
in 1905, subjecting the college to taxation.
207. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Washington, 222 U.S. 370 (1912).
Consistent with doctrine of national supremacy and preemption,
state laws, including one of the State of Washington, regulating hours
of service embracing employees of interstate carriers, became
inoperative immediately upon the adoption of the Federal Hours of
Service Law notwithstanding that the latter did not go into effect until
a year after its passage.
208. Southern Ry. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912).
Inasmuch as it conflicted with Sec. 2 of the Hepburn Act of 1906
(34 Stat. 584) forbidding interstate railway carriers to make shipments
until rates had been fixed and published by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, which in this matter had not yet acted, a North Carolina
statute requiring carriers, under penalty for refusal, to transport
interstate freight as soon as it was received was unenforceable.
Concurring: Justices McKenna, Holmes, Hughes, Van Devanter, Lamar,
Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justice Lurton.
Accord: Southern Ry. v. Reid & Beam, 222 U.S. 444 (1912).
Accord: Southern Ry. v. Burlington Lumber Co., 225 U.S. 99
(1912).
209. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U.S. 70
(1912).
Kentucky statute prohibiting common carriers from transporting
intoxicating liquors to ``dry'' points in Kentucky was constitutionally
inapplicable to interstate shipments of such liquor to consignees in
Kentucky.
210. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912).
Colorado law levying tax of 2 cents on each $1,000 of a
corporation's capital stock could not constitutionally be collected from
a Kansas corporation engaged in interstate commerce, the greater part of
whose property and business were located and conducted outside Colorado.
211. Oklahoma v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U.S. 298 (1912).
Oklahoma law which purported to be an ad valorem tax on the
property of corporations, levied in the form of a three per cent gross
receipts tax, and computed, in the case of express companies doing an
interstate business, as a percentage of gross receipts from all sources,
interstate as well as intrastate, which is equal to the proportion which
its business in Oklahoma bears to its total business was void as applied
to such express companies; the tax burdened interstate
[[Page 2067]]
commerce and was levied, contrary to due process, on property in the
form of income from investments and bonds located outside the State.
212. Haskell v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 224 U.S. 217 (1912).
Oklahoma conservation law, insofar as it withheld from foreign
corporations the right to lay pipe lines across highways for purposes of
transporting natural gas in interstate commerce, imposed an invalid
burden on interstate commerce.
213. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354 (1912).
Arkansas law compelling railroads to pay claimants within 30
days after notice of injury to livestock caused by their trains, and,
upon default thereof, authorizing claimants to recover double the
damages awarded by a jury plus an attorney's fee, notwithstanding that
the amount sued for was less than the amount originally claimed, in
effect penalized the railroads for their refusal to pay excessive
claims, and accordingly effected an arbitrary deprivation of property
without due process of law.
214. Bucks Stove Co. v. Vickers, 226 U.S. 205 (1912).
Kansas law which exacted certain requirements, such as obtaining
permission of the State Charter Board, paying filing and license fees,
and submitting annual statements listing all stockholders, as a
condition prerequisite to doing business in Kansas and suing in its
courts could not constitutionally be applied to foreign corporations
engaged in interstate commerce; a State cannot exact a franchise for the
privilege of engaging in such commerce.
215. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Hardwick Elevator Co., 226 U.S. 426
(1913).
Congress, by enactment of the Hepburn Act (34 Stat. 584 (1906))
having preempted the field of regulation pertaining to the duty of
carriers to deliver cars in interstate commerce, a Minnesota Reciprocal
Demurrage Law imposing like regulations was void.
216. Accord: St. Louis, I. Mt. & S. Ry. v. Edwards, 227 U.S. 265 (1913).
Arkansas Demurrage Law of 1907 penalizing carriers for failure
to notify consignees of arrival of shipments was similarly held void.
217. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913).
Congress through adoption of the Carmack Amendment having
preempted the field of regulation pertaining to the liability of
interstate carriers for loss and damage to interstate shipments, a
Kentucky law in conflict therewith which precluded an interstate carrier
from contracting to limit its liability to an agreed or declared value
was void.
218. Accord: Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Miller, 226 U.S. 513 (1913).
An Iowa law and a provision of the Nebraska Constitution were
held to have been superseded by the Carmack Amendment.
[[Page 2068]]
219. Accord: Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. v. Latta, 226 U.S. 519 (1913).
Nebraska constitutional provision was held to have been
superseded.
220. Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389 (1913).
Arkansas statute, exacting license and fee from peddlers of
lightning rods and other articles, as applied to representatives of a
Missouri corporation soliciting orders for the sale and subsequent
delivery of stoves by said corporation, imposed an invalid burden on
interstate commerce.
Accord: Rogers v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 401 (1913).
221. Accord: Stewart v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 665 (1914), voiding
application of a similar Michigan law.
222. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
Wisconsin food labeling law, insofar as it exacted labelling
requirements as to articles in interstate commerce which were in
conflict with those required under the Federal Pure Food and Drug Act,
imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce.
223. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Harriman Bros., 227 U.S. 657 (1913).
Inasmuch as the federal Carmack Amendment preempted the field of
regulation pertaining to determination of an interstate railroad's
liability for loss or damages to goods in transit, Texas law outlawing
contractual stipulations specifying a period of limitations for filing
of claims by a shipper which was briefer than that sanctioned by the
federal law was unenforceable.
Concurring: Justices Lurton, McKenna, Holmes, Hughes (separately),
Day, Van Devanter, Lamar, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justice Pitney.
224. Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148 (1913).
Washington statute of 1907 repealing a prior act of 1893 with
the result that rights to consequential damages for a change of street
grade that had already accrued under the earlier act were destroyed
amounted to an invalid deprivation of property without due process of
law.
225. St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. v. Seale, 229 U.S. 156 (1913).
When the Federal Employers' Liability Act was applicable, by
reason that the injured employee was engaged in interstate commerce, a
Texas law affording a remedy for said injuries was superseded by reason
of the supremacy of the former.
Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Lurton,
Hughes, Pitney, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justice Lamar.
[[Page 2069]]
226. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Hall, 229 U.S. 511 (1913).
Iowa law pertaining to attachment of wages of a railroad worker
adjudicated bankrupt within less than four months thereafter was in
conflict with federal bankruptcy law nullifying liens obtained within
four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy and hence
was not entitled to full faith and credit in Nebraska courts.
227. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340 (1913).
Kansas statute which did not permit a carrier to have the
sufficiency of rates established thereunder determined by judicial
review and which exposed the carrier, when sued for charging rates in
excess thereof, to a liability for liquidated damages in the sum of
$500, which was unrelated to actual damages, effected an
unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law.
228. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914).
North Dakota law which made railroads liable for double damages
in case of failure to pay a claim, within 60 days after notice, or to
offer to pay a sum equal to what a jury found the claimant entitled to
was arbitrary and deprived the carriers of property without due process
of law.
Accord: Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Kennedy, 232 U.S. 626
(1914).
229. Harrison v. St. Louis, S. F. & T. R.R., 232 U.S. 318 (1914).
Oklahoma law which prohibited foreign corporations, upon penalty
of forfeiting their license to do business in that State, from invoking
the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of federal courts and
instituting actions therein exacted an unconstitutional condition.
230. Foote v. Maryland, 232 U.S. 495 (1914).
Maryland Oyster Inspection tax of 1910, levied on oysters coming
from other States, the proceeds from which were used partly for
inspection and partly for other purposes, such as the policing of state
waters, was void as imposing a burden on interstate commerce in excess
of the expenses absolutely necessary for inspection.
231. Farmers Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U.S. 516 (1914).
Minnesota tax on bonds issued by a municipality of the Territory
of Oklahoma and held by Minnesota corporations was void as a tax on a
federal instrumentality (Art. VI).
232. Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195 (1914).
Amendment in 1911 of California constitution of 1879, and
municipal ordinances of Los Angeles adopted in pursuance of the
amendment were ineffectual by reason of the prohibition against
impairment of contracts contained in Art. I, Sec. 10, of the Federal
Constitution, to deprive a utility of rights acquired before said
amendment,
[[Page 2070]]
which embraced the privilege of laying gas pipes under the streets of
Los Angeles.
233. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U.S. 304 (1914).
Alabama sewing machine license tax could not be collected from
those agencies of a foreign corporation engaged wholly in an interstate
business, that is, in soliciting orders for machines to be accepted and
fulfilled at the Georgia office of the seller.
234. Tennessee Coal Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914).
Since venue is not part of a transitory cause of action, Alabama
law which created such cause of action by making the employer liable to
the employee for injuries attributable to defective machinery was
inoperative insofar as it sought to withhold from such employee the
right to sue on such action in courts of any State other than Alabama;
the full faith and credit clause of Art. IV does not preclude a court in
another State which acquired jurisdiction from enforcing such right of
action.
235. Carondelet Canal Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U.S. 362 (1914).
Louisiana act of 1906 repealing prior act of 1858 and
sequestering with compensation certain property acquired by a canal
company under the repealed enactment impaired an obligation of contact.
236. Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914).
Texas act of 1914 stipulating that only those who have
previously served two years as freight train conductors or brakemen
shall be eligible to serve as railroad train conductors was arbitrary
and effected a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
237. Erie R.R. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671 (1914).
Congress having completely preempted the field by its Hours of
Service Act of 1907, notwithstanding that it did not take effect until
1908, a New York labor law of 1907 regulating hours of service of
railroad telegraph operators engaged in interstate commerce effected an
invalid regulation of such commerce.
238. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
Kentucky criminal and antitrust provisions, both constitutional
and statutory, were void for vagueness and hence violative of due
process because a prohibition of combinations which establish prices
that are greater or lower than the ``real market value'' of an article
as established by ``fair competition'' and ``under normal market
conditions'' afforded no standard that was possible to know in advance
and to obey.
Concurring: Justices Holmes, Hughes, Lamar, Day, Lurton, Van
Devanter, Chief Justice White.
[[Page 2071]]
Dissenting: Justices McKenna, Pitney.
Accord: International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579
(1914); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634 (1914); American Machine Co.
v. Kentucky, 236 U.S. 660 (1915).
239. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Larabee, 234 U.S. 459 (1914).
Kansas statute empowering a Kansas court to award against a
litigant attorney's fees attributable to the presentation before the
United States Supreme Court of an appeal in a mandamus proceeding was
inoperative consistently with the principle of national supremacy, for a
state court cannot be empowered by state law to assess fees for services
rendered in a federal court when such assessment is sanctioned neither
by federal law nor by the rules of the Supreme Court.
240. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914).
South Carolina law making mental anguish resulting from
negligent non-delivery of a telegram a cause of action could not be
invoked to support an action for negligent non-delivery in the District
of Columbia, an area beyond the jurisdiction of South Carolina and,
consistent with due process, removed from the scope of its legislative
power. The statute, as applied to messages sent from South Carolina to
another jurisdiction, also was an invalid regulation of interstate
commerce.
241. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
Alabama law which permitted person convicted of an offense to
contract with another whereby, in consideration of the latter becoming
surety for the convicted person's fine, the convicted person agreed to
perform certain services, and which further stipulated that if such
contract was breached, the convicted person would become subject to a
fine equal to the damages sustained by the other contracting party and
payment of which would be remitted to said contracting party imposed a
form of peonage proscribed by the Thirteenth Amendment.
Concurring: Justice Holmes (separately).
242. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
Oklahoma Separate Coach Law violated the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment by permitting carriers to provide sleeping,
dining, and chair cars for whites but not for Negroes.
Concurring: Chief Justice White (separately), Justices Holmes
(separately), Lamar (separately), McReynolds (separately).
243. Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914).
South Dakota law which required a foreign corporation to appoint
a local agent to accept service of process as a condition precedent to
suing in state courts to collect a claim arising out of interstate
commerce imposed an invalid burden on said commerce.
[[Page 2072]]
244. Choctaw & Gulf R.R. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292 (1914).
Oklahoma privilege tax, insofar as it was levied on sale of coal
extracted from lands owned by Indian tribes and leased on their behalf
by the Federal Government was invalid as a tax on federal
instrumentality.
245. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
Kansas law proscribing ``yellow dog'' contracts whereby the
employer exacted of employees an agreement not to join or remain a
member of a union as a condition of acquiring and retaining employment
deprived employees of liberty of contract contrary to due process.
Concurring: Justices Pitney, McKenna, Van Devanter, Lamar,
McReynolds, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justices Day, Hughes, Holmes (separately).
246. Heyman v. Hays, 236 U.S. 178 (1915).
Tennessee county privilege tax law, insofar as it was enforced
as to a liquor dealer doing a strictly mail-order business confined to
shipments to out-of-state destinations was void as a burden on
interstate commerce.
Accord: Southern Operating Co. v. Hayes, 236 U.S. 188 (1915).
247. Globe Bank v. Martin, 236 U.S. 288 (1915).
Consistently with the principle of national supremacy,
attachments and liens on real estate of a bankrupt, acquired pursuant to
Kentucky laws within four months prior to the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy under federal law, were null and void, and distribution of
the proceeds from the sale of such real estate was governed by federal
rather than by state law.
248. Southern Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S. 439 (1915).
An Indiana statute requiring railway companies to place grab-
irons and hand-holds on the sides and ends of every car having been
superseded by the Federal Safety Appliance Act, penalties imposed under
the former could not be recovered as to cars operated on interstate
railroads, although engaged only in intrastate traffic.
249. Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 568 (1915).
Kansas prohibition law could not be validly enforced to prevent
Kansas dealer from accepting orders for alcoholic beverages which were
to be completed by interstate delivery to Kansas purchasers from a point
in Missouri; under the federal Wilson Act the interstate transportation
did not end until delivery to the consignee was completed.
[[Page 2073]]
250. Northern Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota ex rel. McCue, 236 U.S. 585
(1915).
North Dakota law compelling carriers to haul certain commodities
at less than compensatory rates deprived them of property without due
process.
Concurring: Justices Hughes, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter,
Lamar, McReynolds, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justice Pitney.
251. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Conley, 236 U.S. 605 (1915).
West Virginia law which compelled carriers to haul passengers at
noncompensatory rates deprived them of property without due process.
Concurring: Justices Hughes, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter,
Lamar, McReynolds, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justice Pitney.
252. Wright v. Central of Georgia Ry., 236 U.S. 674 (1915).
Since the lessee of two railroads, built under special charters
containing irrepealable contracts exempting the railway property from
taxation in excess of a given rate was to be viewed as in the same
position as the owners, levy of an ad valorem tax on the lessee in
excess of the charter rate impaired the obligation of contract (Art. I,
Sec. 10).
Concurring: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, Chief
Justice White.
Dissenting: Justices Hughes, Pitney, McReynolds.
Accord: Wright v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 687
(1915).
Concurring: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, Chief
Justice White.
Dissenting: Justices Hughes, Pitney, McReynolds.
253. Davis v. Virginia, 236 U.S. 697 (1915).
Solicitation by a peddler in Virginia of orders for portraits
made in another State, with an option to the purchaser to select frames
upon delivery of the portrait by the peddler, amounted to a single
transaction in interstate commerce, and Virginia therefore could not
validly impose a peddler's license tax on the solicitor of such orders.
242. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Wisconsin R.R. Comm'n, 237 U.S. 220 (1915).
Wisconsin statute requiring interstate trains to stop at
villages of a specified number of inhabitants, without regard to the
volume of business done there, was void as imposing an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce.
[[Page 2074]]
255. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915).
Florida statute denied due process insofar as it provided, after
execution against a corporation had been returned ``no property,'' a
second execution to issue against a stockholder for the same debt to be
enforced against his property to the extent of any unpaid subscription
owing on his stock and without notice to such stockholder.
256. Charleston & W. C. Ry. v. Varnville Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915).
South Carolina law which imposed a penalty on carriers for their
failure to adjust claims within 40 days imposed an invalid burden on
interstate commerce and also was in conflict with the federal Carmack
Amendment.
257. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56 (1915).
Kansas Reciprocal Demurrage Law of 1905 which allowed recovery
of an attorney's fee by the shipper in case of delinquency by the
carrier but which accorded the carrier no like privilege in case of
delinquency on the part of the shipper denied the carrier equal
protection of the law.
258. Rossi v. Pennsylvania, 238 U.S. 62 (1915).
Pennsylvania liquor law could not be enforced against one who
solicited orders for the delivery of alcoholic beverages to be shipped
to the consignee from another State; under the federal Wilson Act of
1890 liquor shipped in interstate commerce did not become subject to
State regulation until after delivery to the consignee.
259. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
Oklahoma grandfather clause, in its 1910 constitution, exempting
from a literacy requirement and automatically enfranchising all entitled
to vote as of January 1, 1866, or who were descendants of those entitled
to vote on the latter date, was violative of the Fifteenth Amendment
protecting Negroes from discriminatory denial of the right to vote based
on race.
260. Accord: Mayers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915) wherein a similar
Maryland grandfather clause was voided.
261. Southwestern Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915).
Arkansas statute was held to be unreasonable and violative of
due process for the reason that, as enforced, it subjected a telephone
company to a $6300 penalty for discriminatory refusal to serve when,
pursuant to company regulations known to the State and uniformly
enforced for economical collection of its approved rates, it suspended
services to a delinquent and refused to resume services, while the
delinquency remained unpaid, at the reduced rate afforded to those who
paid the monthly service charge in advance.
[[Page 2075]]
262. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491 (1915).
Wisconsin statute which compelled sleeping car companies, if
upper berth was not sold, to accord use of the space thereof to
purchaser of a lower berth took salable property from the owner without
compensation and therefore effected a deprivation of property without
due process of law.
Concurring: Justices Lamar, Day, Hughes, Van Devanter, Pitney,
McReynolds, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justices McKenna, Holmes.
263. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
Arizona statute which compelled establishments hiring five or
more workers to reserve 80 per cent of the employment opportunities to
citizens denied aliens the equal protection of the laws.
Concurring: Justices Hughes, Holmes, Pitney, Lamar, Day, Van
Devanter, McKenna, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justice McReynolds.
264. Provident Savings Ass'n v. Kentucky, 239 U.S. 103 (1915).
Kentucky statute levying tax, in the nature of a license tax for
the doing of local business, on premiums collected in New York by a
foreign insurance company after it had ceased to do business in that
State was violative of due process by reason of affecting activities
beyond the jurisdiction of the State.
265. Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522 (1916).
Oklahoma tax on lessee's interest in Indian lands, acquired
pursuant to federal statutory authorization, was void as a tax on a
federal instrumentality.
266. Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241 U.S. 48 (1916).
Texas statute imposing special licenses on express companies
maintaining offices for C.O.D. delivery of interstate shipments of
alcoholic beverages imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce
under the terms of the Wilson Act of 1890 (26 Stat. 313).
267. McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916).
Louisiana law which established a rebuttable presumption that
any person systematically purchasing sugar in Louisiana at a price below
that which he paid in any other State was a party to a monopoly or
conspiracy in restraint of trade was violative of both the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it
declared an individual presumptively guilty of a crime and exempted
countless others paying the same price.
[[Page 2076]]
268. Wisconsin v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal Co., 241 U.S. 329 (1916).
Wisconsin law which revoked the license of any foreign
corporation which removed to a federal court a suit instituted against
it by a Wisconsin citizen imposed an unconstitutional condition.
269. Detroit United Ry. v. Michigan, 242 U.S. 238 (1916).
Construction of acts of 1905 and 1907 as compelling a Detroit
City Railway to extend its lines to suburban areas annexed by Detroit
only on the same terms as were contained in its initial franchise as
authorized by the Detroit ordinance of 1889, wherein its fare was fixed,
operated to impair the obligation of contract.
Concurring: Justices Pitney, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter, McReynolds,
Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justices Clarke, Brandeis.
270. Rowland v. Boyle, 244 U.S. 106 (1917).
The two-cent passenger rate fixed by act of the Arkansas
legislature was confiscatory and accordingly deprived the railroad of
its property without due process.
271. New York Central R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
Congress, by enactment of the Federal Employees' Liability Act,
having preempted the field as to determination of the liability of
interstate railroad carriers to compensate employees for injuries
sustained while engaged in interstate commerce, award under New York
Workmen's Compensation Act for injuries sustained in interstate commerce
by railway employee could not be upheld.
Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, Holmes, Pitney, McReynolds, Day,
McKenna, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Clarke.
272. Accord: Erie R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 170 (1917).
For the same reason, a New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act was
held inapplicable to a railway worker injured while engaged in
interstate commerce.
Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, Holmes, Day, Pitney, McKenna,
McReynolds, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Clarke.
273. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
New York Workmen's Compensation Act was unconstitutional as
applied to employees engaged in maritime work, for it afforded a remedy
unknown to common law, and hence was not among the common law remedies
saved to suitors from exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction by the
Judiciary Act of 1789.
Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Day, Van Devanter, McKenna, Chief
Justice White.
[[Page 2077]]
Dissenting: Justices Holmes (separately), Pitney (separately),
Brandeis, Clarke.
Accord: Clyde S.S. Co. v. Walker, 244 U.S. 255 (1917).
Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Day, Van Devanter, McKenna, Chief
Justice White.
Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Pitney, Brandeis, Clarke.
274. Accord: Steamship Bowdoin Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of
California, 246 U.S. 648 (1918), as to the inoperative effect of
a California Workmen's Compensation Act.
275. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917).
Georgia ``Blow-Post'' law imposed an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce insofar as compliance with it would have required an
interstate train to come practically to a stop at each of 124 ordinary
grade crossings within a distance of 123 miles in Georgia and would have
added more than six hours to the running time of the train.
Concurring: Justices McKenna, Holmes, McReynolds, Day, Clarke, Van
Devanter.
Dissenting: Chief Justice White, Justices Pitney, Brandeis.
276. Western Oil Ref. Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U.S. 346 (1917).
Tennessee privilege tax could not validly be imposed on
interstate sales consummated at either destination in Tennessee by an
Indiana corporation which, for the purpose of filling orders taken by
its salesmen in Tennessee, shipped thereto a tank car of oil and a
carload of barrels and filled the orders through an agent who drew the
oil from the tank car into the barrels, or into barrels furnished by
customers, and then made delivery and collected the agreed price, and
thereafter moved the two cars to another point in Tennessee for
effecting like deliveries.
Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, Holmes, Brandeis, Pitney,
McReynolds, Day, Clarke, McKenna.
Dissenting: Chief Justice White.
277. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
Washington law which proscribed private employment agencies by
prohibiting them from collecting fees for their services deprived
individuals of the liberty to pursue a lawful calling contrary to due
process of law.
Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Pitney, Van Devanter, Chief Justice
White.
Dissenting: Justices McKenna, Brandeis, Holmes, Clarke.
278. American Express Company v. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617 (1917).
Consistent with natural supremacy, South Dakota law regulating
advance of interstate rates could not be applied to changes in intra
[[Page 2078]]
state rates which a carrier put into effect pursuant to an order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission to abate discrimination against
interstate traffic.
Concurring: Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Pitney, McReynolds, Day,
Clarke, Van Devanter, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justice McKenna.
279. Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U.S. 105 (1917).
Kentucky act of 1906, amending act of 1894 and construed in such
manner as to enable a county to avoid collection of taxes to repay
judgment on unpaid bonds impaired the obligation of contract.
Accord: Hendrickson v. Creager, 245 U.S. 115 (1917).
280. Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178 (1917).
Texas law, which, under the guise of taxing the privilege of
doing an intrastate business, imposed on an Illinois corporation a
license tax based on its authorized capital stock, was void not only as
imposing a burden on interstate commerce, but also as contravening the
due process clause by affecting property outside the jurisdiction of
Texas.
281. Crew Levick v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917).
Pennsylvania gross receipts tax on wholesalers, as applied to a
merchant who sold part of his merchandise to customers in foreign
countries either as the result of the receipt directly of orders from
them or as the result of orders solicited by agents abroad was void as a
regulation of foreign commerce and as a duty on exports.
282. Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135 (1918).
License fee or excise of a given per cent of the par value of
the entire authorized capital stock of a foreign corporation doing both
a local and interstate business and owning property in several States
was a tax on the entire business and property of the corporation and was
void both as an illegal burden on interstate commerce and as a violation
of due process by reason of affecting property beyond the borders of the
taxing State.
Accord: Locomobile Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 146 (1918).
283. Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918).
When a Connecticut corporation maintains and employs a
Massachusetts office with a stock of samples and an office force and
traveling salesmen merely to obtain local orders subject to confirmation
at the Connecticut office and with deliveries to be made directly from
the latter, its business was interstate commerce and a Massachusetts
annual excise could not be validly applied thereto.
[[Page 2079]]
284. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
Liberty of contract, as protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, precluded enforcement of the Missouri
nonforfeiture statute, prescribing how net value of a life insurance
policy is to be applied to avert a forfeiture in the event the annual
premium is not paid, so as to prevent a Missouri resident from executing
in the New York office of the insurer a different agreement sanctioned
by New York law whereby the policy was pledged as security for a loan
and later canceled in satisfaction of the indebtedness.
Concurring: Justices McReynolds, McKenna, Holmes, Van Devanter,
Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Day, Pitney, Clarke.
285. Georgia v. Cincinnati So. Ry., 248 U.S. 26 (1918).
Georgia act of 1916 revoking a grant in 1879 of a perpetual
right of way to a railroad impaired the obligation of contract (Art. I,
Sec. 10).
286. Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67 (1918).
Missouri act, insofar as it authorized the Missouri Public
Service Commission to exact a fee of $10,000 for a certificate of
authority for issuance by an interstate railroad, doing no intrastate
business in Missouri, of a $30,000,000 mortgage bond issue to meet
expenditures incurred but in small part in that State, imposed an
invalid burden on interstate commerce.
287. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
Kentucky law, insofar as it authorized a judgment against
nonresident individuals based on service against their Kentucky agent
after his appointment had expired, was violative of due process.
288. Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 248 U.S. 525 (1919).
Tax exemptions in charters granted to certain railroads inured
to their lessee, and, accordingly, a Georgia tax authorized by a
constitutional provision postdating such charters and imposed on the
leasehold interest of the lessee impaired the obligation of contract.
289. Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919).
Georgia law under which a New Jersey company's tank cars
operating in and out of that State were assessed upon a track-mileage
basis, i.e., in an amount bearing the same ratio to the value of all its
cars and other personal property as the ratio of the miles of railroad
over which the cars were run in Georgia to the total miles over which
they were run in all States, was invalid for the reason that the rule
bore no necessary relation to the real value in Georgia and hence
conflicted with due process.
Concurring: Justices McReynolds, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter,
Chief Justice White.
[[Page 2080]]
Dissenting: Justices Pitney, Brandeis, Clarke.
290. Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U.S. 389 (1919).
Washington law under which, in a ten-year period, inspection
fees collected on oil products brought into the State for use or
consumption amounted to $335,000, of which only $80,000 was disbursed
for expenses, was deemed to impose an excessive charge and accordingly
an invalid burden on interstate commerce.
291. Chalker v. Birmingham & N.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 522 (1919).
Tennessee act which made the annual tax for the privilege of
doing railway construction work dependent on whether the person taxed
had his chief office in Tennessee, i.e. $25 if he had and $100 if he did
not, was violative of the privilege and immunities clause of Art. IV,
Sec. 2.
292. New Orleans & N.E.R.R. v. Scarlet, 249 U.S. 528 (1919).
Mississippi ``Prima Facie'' act, relieving plaintiff of burden
of proof to establish negligence, could not constitutionally be applied
by a state court in suits under the Federal Employees' Liability Act.
Accord: Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Mullins, 249 U.S. 531 (1919).
293. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566 (1919).
Pennsylvania law, as applied to an interstate train terminated
by a mail car, forbidding operation of any train consisting of United
States mail, or express, cars without rear end of car being equipped
with a platform with guard rails and steps was inoperative by reason of
conflict with federal legislation and regulations which preempted the
field.
Concurring: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, Pitney,
McReynolds, Brandeis, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justice Clarke.
294. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Co., 251 U.S. 27
(1919).
By virtue of federal legislation preempting the field,
Mississippi law could not be applied to determine validity of a contract
by telegraph company limiting its responsibility when its lower rate is
paid for unrepeated interstate messages.
Concurring: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, McReynolds,
Brandeis, Clarke, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justice Pitney.
295. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 (1920).
Federal legislation having preempted the field, Indiana law no
longer was operative to subject a telegraph company to a penalty for
failure to deliver promptly in Indiana a message sent from a point in
Illinois.
[[Page 2081]]
296. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
New York income tax law which allowed exemptions to residents,
with increases for married persons and dependents but which allowed no
equivalent exemptions to nonresidents abridged the privileges and
immunities clause of Art. IV, Sec. 2.
297. Okahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1920).
Oklahoma constitution and laws, under which an order of the
State Corporation Commission declaring a laundry a monopoly and limiting
its rates was not judicially reviewable, and which compelled litigant,
for purposes of obtaining a judicial test of rates, to disobey the order
and invite serious penalty for each day of refusal pending completion of
judicial appeal, were violative of due process insofar as rates were
enforced by penalties.
298. Accord: Oklahoma Gin Co. v. Oklahoma, 252 U.S. 339 (1920).
Illinois law denying Illinois courts jurisdiction in actions for
wrongful death occurring in another State which was construed as barring
jurisdiction of actions on a sister State judgment founded upon a like
cause was, as so applied, violative of the full faith and credit clause.
299. Askren v. Continental Oil Co., 252 U.S. 444 (1920).
New Mexico law levying annual license on distributors of
gasoline plus 2 per gallon on all gasoline sold was a privilege tax,
and, as applied to parties who bring gasoline from without and sell it
in New Mexico, imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce insofar
as it related to their business of selling in tank car lots and in
barrels or packages as originally imported.
300. Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920).
North Dakota act, as administered, imposed invalid burden on
interstate commerce and took property without due process by reason of
taxing an interstate railroad by assessing the value of its property in
the State at that proportion of the total value of its stock and bonds
that the main track mileage within the State bore to the main track
mileage of the entire line; this formula was indefensible inasmuch as
the cost of construction per mile was within than without the taxing
State, and the large and valuable terminals of the railroad were located
elsewhere.
301. Hawke v. Smith (No. 1), 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
Action of Ohio legislature ratifying proposed Eighteenth
Amendment could not be referred to the voters, and the provisions of the
Ohio constitution requiring such referendum were inconsistent with
Article V of the Federal Constitution.
[[Page 2082]]
Accord: Hawke v. Smith (No. 2), 253 U.S. 231 (1920), applicable
to proposed Nineteenth Amendment.
302. Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
Since Pennsylvania Public Service Commission Law failed to
provide opportunity by way of appeal to the courts or by injunctive
proceedings to test issue as to whether rates fixed by Commission are
confiscatory, order of Commission establishing maximum future rates
violated due process of law.
Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Day, Van Devanter, Pitney, McKenna,
Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Clarke.
303. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
Virginia law which taxed all income of local corporation derived
from business within and without Virginia, while exempting entirely
income derived outside of Virginia by local corporations which did no
local business violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Concurring: Justices Pitney, McReynolds, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter,
Clarke, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Holmes.
304. Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920).
Maryland law requiring operator's license of drivers of motor
trucks could not constitutionally be applied to a Postal Department
employee operating a federal mail truck in the performance of official
duty.
Concurring: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, Brandeis,
Clarke, Chief Justice White.
Dissenting: Justices Pitney, McReynolds.
305. Turner v. Wade, 254 U.S. 64 (1920).
Georgia Tax Equalization Act denied due process insofar as it
authorized an increase in the assessed valuation of the taxpayer's
property without notice and hearing and accorded him an abortive remedy
of arbitration which was nullified by the inability of the arbitrators
to agree on a lower assessment before the expiration of the time when
the assessment became final and binding.
306. Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U.S. 126 (1921).
Louisiana law which exempted proceeds of insurance policy,
payable upon death of insured to his executor, from the claims of
insured's creditors impaired the obligation of contract as enforced
against a debt on a promissory note antedating such laws and also as
enforced against policies which antedated the law.
Concurring: Justices McReynolds, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter,
Pitney, Brandeis, Chief Justice White.
[[Page 2083]]
Dissenting: Justice Clarke.
307. Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U.S. 421 (1921).
North Carolina statute which exacted a $500 license fee of every
automobile manufacturer as a condition precedent to selling cars in the
State and which imposed a like requirement on any firm selling cars of a
manufacturer who had not paid the tax, but which reduced the fee to $100
in the event that the manufacturer had invested three-fourths of his
assets in North Carolina state and municipal securities or properties,
was invalid as violative of the commerce clause and of the equal
protection clause when enforced against nonresident manufacturers
selling cars in North Carolina directly or through local dealers.
Concurring: Justices McKenna, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter, McReynolds,
Clarke.
Dissenting: Justices Pitney, Brandeis
308. Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Richmond, 256 U.S. 635 (1921).
Richmond, Virginia, ordinance and Virginia statute which, as
construed, levied a tax on state and national bank shares at the
aggregate rate of $1.75 per $100 of valuation and upon intangibles at
the aggregate rate of 85 per $100 valuation, a substantial proportion of
which property was in the hands of individual taxpayers, were void as in
conflict with federal law prohibiting discriminatory taxation of
national bank shares for the reason that the tax was imposed on the
national bank stocks to the aggregate value of more than $8,000,000
whereas the value of state bank stocks taxed was only $6,000,000.
309. Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921).
New Mexico statute which imposed a tax of 2 cents per gallon
sold on distributors of gasoline was void insofar as it embraced
interstate transactions, but the annual license fee of $5 imposed
thereby on each gasoline station was totally void insofar as interstate
sales threat could not be separated out from the intrastate sales.
310. Kansas City So. Ry. v. Road Improv. Dist. No. 6, 256 U.S. 658
(1921).
Arkansas statute which authorized local assessments for road
improvements denied equal protection of the laws insofar as railroad
property was burdened for local improvement on a basis totally different
from that used for measuring the contribution demanded of individual
owners.
311. Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921).
West Virginia statute which forbade engaging in the business of
transporting petroleum in pipe lines without the payment of a tax of
2 cents for each barrel of oil transported imposed an invalid burden on
interstate commerce as applied to company's volume of oil produced in,
but moving out of, West Virginia to extra-state destinations.
[[Page 2084]]
Concurring: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, McReynolds,
Chief Justice Taft.
Dissenting: Justices Clarke, Pitney, Brandeis.
Accord: United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277 (1921),
voiding like application of the West Virginia tax on the interstate
movement of natural gas.
Concurring: Justices Holmes, Pitney, McReynolds, Day, Van Devanter,
McKenna, Chief Justice Taft.
Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Clarke.
312. Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
Kentucky law prescribing conditions under which foreign
corporations could do business in that State and which precluded
enforcement in Kentucky courts of contracts made by foreign corporations
not complying with said conditions could not be enforced against
Tennessee corporation which sued in a Kentucky court for breach of a
contract consummated in that State for the purchase of grain to be
delivered to and used in Tennessee; such transaction was in interstate
commerce, notwithstanding that the Tennessee purchaser might change its
mind after delivery to a carrier in Kentucky and sell the grain in
Kentucky or consign it to some other place in Kentucky.
Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, Holmes, Pitney, Day, McKenna,
McReynolds, Chief Justice Taft.
Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Clarke.
313. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
Arizona statute, regulating injunctions in labor disputes which
exempted ex-employees, when committing tortious injury to the business
of their former employer in the form of mass picketing, libelous
utterances, and inducement of customers to withhold patronage, while
leaving subject to injunctive restraint all other tort-feasors engaged
in like wrong-doing, deprived the employer of property without due
process and denied him equal protection of the law.
Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, Day, McKenna, McReynolds, Chief
Justice Taft.
Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Pitney, Clarke, Brandeis.
314. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922).
Oklahoma income tax law could not validly be enforced as to net
income of lessee derived from the sales of his share of oil and gas
received under leases of restricted Indian lands which constituted him
in effect an instrumentality used by the United States in fulfilling its
duties to the Indians.
Concurring: Justices Holmes, Day, Van Devanter, McKenna, McReynolds,
Chief Justice Taft.
Dissenting: Justices Pitney, Brandeis, Clarke.
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315. Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922).
Arkansas law which revoked the license of a foreign corporation
to do business in that State whenever it resorted to the federal courts
sitting in that State exacted an unconstitutional condition.
316. Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922).
North Dakota statute which required purchasers of grain to
obtain a license to act under a defined system of grading, inspection,
and weighing, and to abide by regulations as to prices and profits
imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce insofar as it was
applied to a North Dakota association which bought grain in the State
and loaded it promptly on cars for shipment to other States for sale,
notwithstanding occasional diversion of the grain for local sales.
Concurring: Justices Day, McKenna, McReynolds, Van Devanter, Pitney,
Chief Justice Taft.
Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Clarke.
Accord: Lemke v. Homer Farmers Elevator Co., 258 U.S. 65 (1922).
Justices Concurring: Day, McKenna, McReynolds, Pitney, Van Devanter,
Chief Justice Taft.
Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Clarke.
317. Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U.S. 165 (1922).
Rates fixed for the sale of gas by New York statute were
confiscatory and deprived the utility of its property without due
process of law.
Accord: Newton v. New York Gas Co., 258 U.S. 178 (1922); Newton
v. Kings County Lighting Co., 258 U.S. 180 (1922); Newton v. Brooklyn
Union Gas Co., 258 U.S. 604 (1922); Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 259
U.S. 101 (1922).
318. Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 258 U.S. 338
(1922).
Florida law retroactively validating collection of fee for
passage through a canal, the use of which was then free by law, was
ineffective; a legislature could not retroactively approve what it could
not lawfully do.
319. Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466 (1922).
Georgia law levying inspection fees and providing for inspection
of oil and gasoline was unconstitutional as applied to gasoline and oil
in interstate commerce; for the fees clearly exceeded the cost of
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